some form in which it can function as an object of thought. This is so irrespective of whether moral thought and judgment are best understood in cognitivist or expressivist terms (see below). And presumably a principle is specifically moral only if makes reference to a moral property or assertions of or thoughts about it deploy a moral concept.
An account of what a moral principle is should require no specific normative content. Philosophers otherwise as diverse as Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, Hare and Rawls debate whether it is always morally permissible to bring about the best outcome available. But they all agree that whatever the morally right thing to do may be, it can be captured in general principles. Nor should such an account require any particular metaethical -or, more broadly, "metanormative" -views concerning the semantics, the metaphysics or the epistemology of the normative. For instance, Mill and Moore are cognitivists:
they take the primary function of the statements of moral principles to be that of expressing beliefs that represent general moral facts and so can be true or false. By contrast Hare accepts a form of expressivism: he takes the primary function of the statements of moral principles to be that of expressing universal prescriptions which, though capable of taking a propositional guise, aren't the sorts of things that can be true or false. 8 But they all count as generalists in virtue of accepting some form of utilitarianism as the fundamental principle of morality.
So the particularist opposition to principles concerns primarily the structure of morality rather than its substantive first-order content or its metanormative foundations. What particularists resist more precisely is assigning either "contributory" or "overall" principles a fundamental role in morality (Dancy 2004: ch. 2-4). The utilitarian principle that right actions are all and only those actions that maximize general happiness is one example of an overall moral principle. By contrast contributory principles concern the contribution of a particular factor (stealing, killing, promise-breaking, ...) to the overall moral statuses of particular 8 The formulations of cognitivism and expressivism given in the text are rough and meant only to give the general idea.
objects of moral assessment (actions, states of affairs, and so on).
The notion of a contributory principle is needed because many people want to acknowledge a plurality of morally relevant considerations that somehow combine to determine overall moral status. How this happens has important implications for moral theory but remains inadequately understood. 9 In any case the idea that what one ought to do in a given situation is some function of potentially multiple relevant considerations is familiar: an action might be right insofar as doing it would fulfill a promise but wrong insofar as it is incompatible with saving a drowning child. These contributory reasons can be opposed (most things have some features that count in their favor but others that count against them) and outweighed (considerations on one side are stronger than those on the other). But they can be pro tanto: they can remain in force -and sometimes ground residual duties of compensation, regret, or the like -even if they are outweighed. 10 It then becomes a significant question whether contributory reasons work in a principled way. Philosophers associated with contemporary particularism (most prominently Jonathan Dancy and Margaret Little) claim that even the way that contributory reasons get determined is too complex and sensitive to context to be captured in general principles. The traditional family dispute within generalism is between those (such as Kant and Mill) who agree that there are true general principles about what one ought to do overall and those (such as Ross) who argue that the way that contributory moral principles combine to determine overall moral status is much too complex and sensitive to context to be captured in general principles. Particularism denies the presupposition shared by these views. Not even contributory principles play a fundamental role 9 The overall moral status of a situation may not be determined in any straightforwardly additive fashion and the relevant combinatorial function(s) can get very complex. See Kagan (1988) , Dancy (2000) , Berker (2007) , and, for the relation between reasons and ought generally, Broome, 'Reasons and Ought', in this volume.
10 See the notion of "prima facie duty" in Ross (1930: ch. 2) . My formulation doesn't assume that what is a pro tanto reason to φ in one situation must be a pro tanto reason to φ in all other situations. (Compare the "argument from holism" discussed in §5.) in morality.
Moral Principles: Standards vs. Guides
What roles might moral theorists ask principles (whether contributory or overall)
to play in morality? Moral theories can be thought of as having both a theoretical and a practical function. First, moral theories aim to explain certain phenomena.
Those who take morality seriously wish to understand not merely what things are morally right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, but also why they are so. Second, moral theories aim to guide action. Those who take morality seriously wish to figure out what they ought to do before action, not only in hindsight. 11 Different forms of particularism correspond to denying that general principles play one or the other (or either) of these roles.
Let's first consider the notion of a principle relevant to the theoretical function of moral theories. Few of us think that wrong actions are "wrong, period".
Their wrongness is at least typically "grounded in", or "results from", or "holds in virtue of", other facts. 12 Some wrong actions are so because they involve deception, others because they are selfish, yet others because they cause death, and so on. One notion of a moral principle is a "standard" for something to have a given moral feature such as rightness or wrongness. A standard in the relevant sense would be some kind of a general connection between the moral feature and a set of features or conditions in virtue of which things have it, or perhaps a proposition that states such a connection. 13
Principles understood as standards can play a theoretically significant role only if they have certain kinds of modal and explanatory implications. First, genuine moral standards must support counterfactuals ("If p were the case, then 11 These roles need to be kept distinct even if both are essential. It might turn out that no moral claim, principle or otherwise, fully meets the demands of both. 12 I say "at least typically" because many philosophers think that the most fundamental, or "basic", moral principles have no further ground. 13 The term "standard" is due to McKeever and Ridge (2006: 7) . They understand moral principles as standards for the correct application of moral concepts, but reference to concept application seems inessential.
q would be the case"). And at least the basic moral principles are often regarded as necessary, not contingent. If a claim like "It has been wrong of me to treat others as mere means to my ends" were correct merely as a summary of past cases, it wouldn't support the counterfactual "If one were to treat another person as mere means, that would be wrong", except perhaps accidentally. And if its truth were necessary, it would entail something logically yet stronger, namely that treating others as mere means is wrong in all possible worlds.
These modal implications are related to the idea that a moral principle must be universal : it must make no essential reference to particular persons, times, or places. The idea seems to be that a principle that built in an ineliminable reference to a particular person (say) would make moral distinctions on the basis of a feature that is fundamentally morally arbitrary or irrelevant. Hitting someone, for instance, doesn't become any less wrong merely because it was done by me rather than you or on Friday night rather than Sunday morning; if there is a moral difference, it must be expressible without such particular references.
(Perhaps you were hitting a drunken assailant in self-defense whereas I was hitting a helpless old lady to rob her.)
Principles that are universal may vary a lot in other ways. In particular, their content may range from quite narrow to highly general. 14 A principle according to which killing is at least pro tanto wrong in all circumstances has a broader scope than one according to which killing is always at least pro tanto wrong except in cases of self-defense -but both are universal. A universal principle could be so narrowly tailored that it applies only to one case. A highly narrow principle might fail to play such explanatory roles as capturing what some set of seemingly disparate actual cases have in common. But the intuitive idea that an appropriately explanatory moral principle should have some significant degree of generality is difficult to firm up. Generality comes in finely grained degrees.
The modal implications of moral principles aren't built into a different important sense in which reasons may be general. It is common to suppose that our concept of a reason is a concept of a reason relation -a relation between 14 See Hare (1972) for the distinction between universality and generality. Turning now more briefly to the practical function of morality, principles might fulfill it by providing guidance for moral reasoning, decisions and action in the face of moral novelty, uncertainty and difficulty. So another notion of 17 Discussions of supervenience in the context of particularism include Dancy (1993: 73-8; 2004: 86-9) , Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2000) , Little (2000) , McKeever and Ridge (2006: 7-8) ,
and Strandberg (2008) .
18 See e.g. Salmon (1989) on this general point about explanation.
19 See e.g. Strandberg (2008) , Väyrynen (2009b) , and Leibowitz (2011) . 20 See e.g. Lance and Little (2007) , Robinson (2008; Väyrynen (2009b) . 21 One hard case for this characterization are views like analytic utilitarianism, according to which the property of being morally right is identical to the property of maximizing aggregate utility because the predicates is morally right and maximizes aggregate utility are analytically equivalent. One might think that if so, then the fact that an action maximizes aggregate utility cannot explain the fact that it is right. In that case analytic utilitarianism would imply that substantive moral standards don't play a significant explanatory role, but would still not count as particularist. I cannot pursue these complications here. But it is worth noting that analytic moral theories are marginal in contemporary moral theory.
a moral principle is a general claim that functions as a "guide". A valuable guide in at least one relevant sense would be such that people -or, at least, conscientious moral agents who care about morality -can more reliably act in morally valuable ways and avoid immoral actions with its assistance than without it. 22 A reliable guide for "acting well" in this sense needn't (though it may) be explanatory in the above sense. Nor need it be an algorithmic decision procedure which will guide us to right action without fail and can be applied to particular cases without any further exercise of judgment. As we'll see in §7 below, particularists nonetheless argue that, even allowing the need for judgment, relying on principles in deliberation is at best a good heuristic for acting well but more often a hindrance.
Three Forms of Moral Particularism
There are three main forms which opposition to both contributory and overall principles -whether as theoretical standards or practical guides -may take.
(1) There are no true or valid moral principles. The debate about particularism has been shifting from claims like (1) towards claims like (3). 25 For instance, the current official formulation of particularism by Jonathan Dancy, a leading particularist, says: "The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend upon the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles" (Dancy 2004: 7) . This is a dependence claim along the lines of (3). But reference to "moral thought and judgment" doesn't draw the line in quite the right place. Many generalists allow that there can be moral agents who don't accept or even implicitly rely on moral principles, just as many particularists allow that some agents (however mistakenly) follow principles. What these generalists would claim is not that such agents cannot engage in moral thought and judgment, but that they are unlikely to get their moral judgments reliably right (McKeever and Ridge 2006; Väyrynen 2006; . This is why I formulate this third form of particularism as in (3) above. What exactly (3) says turns further on just what the relevant dependence relation is in the case of principles understood as standards or as guides.
It makes dialectical sense to frame discussion around the third form of particularism. While (1)-(3) are mutually compatible, (3) is logically the weakest. It can allow that morality happens to display some patterns that can be captured in informative general claims. What (3) denies is that morality must be so (for instance, that moral principles are partly constitutive of what morality is) or that anything in morality hangs on it. (3) will still be strong enough to count as a form of particularism about standards so long as it denies that particular moral facts depend for their existence, or the corresponding moral judgments for their correctness, on principles. And (3) will still count as a form of particularism about guides so long as it denies that reliable moral guidance depends on principles. These claims don't require that the very conditions of moral thought 24 Each of (1)- (3) is to be understood as allowing that some substantive moral claims are correct and knowable. Particularism isn't a form of general moral skepticism, but only denies a particular view of the nature of morality. 25 Compare, for instance, the positions defended in Dancy (1993) and Dancy (2004) .
and judgment depend on principles. But if they are correct, principles will still have a hard time playing any fundamental theoretical or practical role.
These forms of particularist opposition to moral principles needn't extend to everything that one could decide to call a principle. Particularism allows, for instance, that the way that past situations have turned out morally could be summarized in useful "rules of thumb" for future deliberation. Such summary generalizations won't serve to explain why particular situations turn out morally as they do or constrain how future situations may turn out morally. They are also in principle dispensable in deliberation. Hence they make no claim to play a fundamental theoretical or practical role.
The Argument from Reasons Holism
What would support particularism about principles in their theoretical role as standards? Consider first those particularists who claim that there are no true moral principles or no good evidence for their existence. How might generalists seek to settle this dispute? Showing that some particular principle is true might be effective against these forms of particularism but not enough to establish that the whole range of moral reasons depends on some suitable provision of general principles. For that result wouldn't yet show that morality isn't fragmented.
This worry would go away if the principle being established were an overarching overall principle like utilitarianism or the Kantian Categorical Imperative. But such principles are highly controversial. Those generalists who defend a view about the structure of morality might not be happy to rest their case on the resolution of long-standing debates in substantive normative ethics.
The most prominent argument for particularism, the so-called "argument from holism", avoids these dialectical problems. The holism at issue concerns an important kind of sensitivity of reasons to context. The idea can be brought out with examples. One might think that although actions which cause pleasure are very often the better for it, they are in no way better when they bring pleasure to a sadist delighting in his victim's pain. Or one might think that even if the fact that I promised to do something is normally a reason to do it, that fact may be no reason at all when the promise was given under deception or duress. 26
The "reasons holism" that such examples are used to motivate is a modal thesis about reason relations. It says that a consideration that is a reason to φ in one set of circumstances may be no reason at all, or a even a reason not to φ, in some different set of circumstances (Dancy 1993: 60; 2000: 132, 135 Dancy (1993; and Little (2000) . 27 The qualifier "qua a reason" is meant to allow that some considerations may be invariable reasons so long as this is due to some idiosyncratic feature, such as their particular content (Dancy 2000: 136) . The idea is that if (say) the fact that an act would be courageous invariably counts in its favor, this just tells us something about courage, not about the nature of normative reasonhood.
28 Instrumental reasons are discussed in Kolodny, 'Instrumental Reasons', in this volume. 29 The most prominent statement of this argument is Dancy (1993: ch. 4) . See also Little (2000) and Dancy (2000) .
features of a situation do to an action when they are normative reasons for (or against) performing it. But particularism about standards concerns the explanation of the rightness of an action to which features of a situation contribute when they make an action right (or wrong). So the favoring relation and the right-making relation seem distinct. Even if "most features which stand in the favoring relation to an action are also right-makers", this would do "nothing to
show that if one relation is holistic, so must the other be" (Dancy 2004: 79) .
So shouldn't the argument from holism to particularism then proceed from the holism of the right-making relation? Nonetheless it seems reasonable to assume provisionally that if the reasons for doing something are variable qua reasons, then so must be the reasons why it is right. It would be surprising if normative reasons were holistic but explanatory reasons weren't (Dancy 2004: 79-80) .
Generalists have taken issue with the argument from holism with respect both to its soundness and its validity. Objection to its soundness focus on reasons holism. Some generalists argue that holism is false because morality is based on some factors which are or generate invariable reasons. Perhaps, for instance, morality is based on virtues and vices, and these give rise to invariable reasons.
The idea would be that whether an action is right or good is determined by whether it is generous, courageous, just, and so on, and if something is generous, courageous, just, and so on, that is invariably a reason to do it. This view can grant to holists that considerations such as lying might have variable moral import; perhaps not all lies need involve dishonesty, which is the real and invariable reason why lying is wrong, when it is (Crisp 2000; McNaughton and Rawling 2000) . In reply, some particularists deny that particular virtues and vices are invariably relevant (perhaps actions can sometimes be worse for being honest or considerate), whereas others limit holism to non-moral considerations. 30
A more modest objection to reasons holism is that the typical examples used to support it are ineffective. All that they show is that a consideration that has For a good discussion of how these different types of moral relevance which holism distinguishes are related to one another, see Bader (forthcoming).
guarantee that a reason exists, and so must include also the presence of enablers and the absence of disablers (Hooker 2000 (Hooker , 2008 Raz 2000 Raz , 2006 . Thus the reason for me to fix your bike isn't simply that I promised; it is that I made an uncoerced and informed promise to fix your bike, and fixing your bike is morally A different move is to object to a claim that is often associated with holism, namely that any consideration whatever can be a reason, given suitable circumstances. Holism alone doesn't yield this view, for reasons might depend on context without being solely determined by it. This threatens to "flatten the moral landscape": considerations like killing, infliction of pain and truth-telling have no deeper sort of moral import than considerations like shoelace color or hair parting (Little 2000) . Some particularists seek to capture this intuitive difference by arguing that some considerations, "default" reasons, need no enablers and hence are reasons unless something prevents them from being so, whereas others, "non-default" reasons, aren't reasons unless enabled by some features of the context. 34 Issues in this debate include which of the various possible notions of a default reason (such as pragmatic, epistemic and metaphysical) are plausible, whether any of them would be sufficient for the particularist purposes, and whether the best way to model them supports particularism. 33 See Bader (forthcoming). The status of the parallel distinction between causes and other causally relevant conditions, and its relation to causal explanation, is controversial in this kind of way; classic discussions include Davidson (1967) and Lewis (1986) . 34 See Cullity (2002), Dancy (2004: 111-17) , and Lance and Little (2006a) . The above responses to the argument from holism challenge its holist premise.
A different response is to challenge its validity by arguing that holism is compatible with generalism. In that case holism wouldn't support particularism even if true. Several philosophers argue that principles concerning moral reasons can incorporate as part of their content the very contextual variability of reasons which follows from holism. 36 Principles can make reference not only to features which provide reasons but also to disablers and enablers. For instance, one could endorse a principle like "Necessarily, that one promised to φ is a reason to φ, unless the promise was given under deception or duress". This specifies the fact that one promised to do something as a reason to do it and the condition that the promise wasn't given under deception or duress as something that must obtain in order for the fact that one promised to do something to be a reason to do it.
The extensionally equivalent atomistic principle "Necessarily, that one made an uncoerced and informed promise to φ is a reason to φ" might not be explanatorily equivalent. For instance, that my promise to φ wasn't given under deception or duress might play a different role in the explanation of why I have reason to φ than the fact that I promised to φ. Accommodating holism is desirable insofar as the distinctions that holism draws among different types of moral relevance really are metaphysically robust and normatively important.
One particularist reply to this objection is that the argument from holism is better understood as indirect. Although holism is compatible with generalism, particularism provides a better explanation of holism. Given holism, it would be a mere "cosmic accident", rather than anything supporting the dependence of morality on principles, if reasons behaved in a way that can be captured in general principles (Little 2000: 277; Dancy 2004: 82) . How this argument is to (Perhaps the idea is that it is merely a fortunate contingency that killing and stealing are so systematically wrong, making people happier so reliably good and so on.) Some generalists develop accounts of moral principles according to which 36 See Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2000), Väyrynen (2004; , and McKeever and Ridge the best overall explanation of particular moral facts under holism still relies on principles (Väyrynen 2006; 2009b) . Others argue that enablers and disablers work in a way that can be explained by general and independently plausible principles of reasoning (Horty 2007 (Horty , 2012 Schroeder 2009 Schroeder , 2011 . In any of these forms, holist generalism will endorse more complicated principles than generalists have traditionally endorsed. But this new program has yet to be put into serious practice in normative ethics.
Moral Principles and the Explanation of Reasons
An important stake in the generalism-particularism debate is whether moral principles play a significant explanatory role with respect to moral reasons and 39 For discussion, see e.g. Kagan (1988) and Dancy (1993) .
other particular moral facts. 40 Any view owes us some account of how the relevant sorts of non-causal explanations work. This burden may be multilayered.
Suppose that the fact that φ-ing would involve lying counts against φ-ing. We might take this to explain (or at least play a role in explaining) why φ-ing would be at least pro tanto wrong. We might then wonder how these normative explanations work. But a further explanatory question could also be asked: why does the fact that φ-ing would involve lying count against φ-ing in the first place?
(Why isn't it morally neutral instead?) We might then wonder how these latter (A view of this kind might be the contractualism of Scanlon 1998.) If that were the case, then morality might involve principles without assigning them a fundamental explanatory role. 41 For a discussion of the relevant notion of grounding and further references, see Väyrynen requirement more precise. To illustrate, just one option is to think that the role of moral principles is to govern or constrain which non-moral facts ground which particular moral facts. Saying this much wouldn't yet settle whether moral principles should be treated as parts of the explanations of particular moral facts by the non-moral facts that ground them. But moral principles needn't be a part of those explanations to play an important role in them. Those explanations would still presuppose moral principles and their depth and counterfactual stability might well be greater owing to their relationship to principles. The exact shape of the explanatory requirement is also going to depend on various general issues about explanation. 42 The explanatory roles that moral principles might play with respect to particular moral facts merit further analysis.
Let's now turn how different generalist replies to the argument from holism bear on normative explanation. Their implications for whether genuine principles can tolerate exceptions constrain the models of normative explanation available to them. Some generalist replies to the argument from holism commit them to pursuing "unhedged" principles which enumerate the potential disablers and enablers. The idea is that it is possible to specify a complete list of the requisite qualifications and exceptions, and thus give at least contributory principles which hold without exception. 43 An example might be that the fact that one promised to do something will always be a reason to do it, provided that the promise was informed and uncoerced, requires nothing morally impermissible, hasn't been canceled by the promisee and (where the blank is a placeholder for all the further relevant features, whatever they may be). 44
This strategy would seem to succeed only if the list of the potential disablers and enablers is finite. One defense of this claim is epistemological: if knowledge (2013) . 42 One example would be precisely whether everything that is necessary for X to explain Y must be part of X. For one general account of explanation that doesn't require this, see Ruben (1990: 199-205) ; cf. Väyrynen (2009b: 114-5) .
43 See e.g. Ross (1930: ch. 2), Hare (1972) , Shafer-Landau (1997) , Gert (1998) of what is morally right and wrong in particular cases is possible (as particularists agree it is), then the idea that moral facts aren't brute can be used to support generalism. 45 If the moral features of things result from their other features (such as that they are cases of lying, killing or the like), then moral knowledge in particular cases requires appropriate sensitivity to these underlying features.
If holism is true, this sensitivity must concern not only considerations that are reasons but also enablers, disablers, and so on. Unless there were only finitely many factors for moral standards to list and for us to check, cognitively limited beings like ourselves couldn't have moral knowledge, since we couldn't reliably judge whether various considerations are undefeated reasons. 46 But more remains to be said about why epistemological considerations should constrain the complexity of moral facts.
Forms of generalism that seek exceptionless moral principles go naturally with the "deductive-nomological" (D-N) model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) . If (successful) explanation consists in a sound deductive argument whose conclusion is the explanans and whose premises are the explanandum consisting in a covering law or principle that is essential to the validity of the argument plus a set of initial conditions, then explanation requires exceptionless 46 If the list of disablers and enablers ended up too complex to be cognitively manageable to humans, then the resulting standards might fail to function as practical guides. 47 Good surveys can be found in Salmon (1989) and Ruben (1990: ch. 6 ). Particularists sometimes criticize generalism on the grounds that good explanations needn't be deductive or "guarantee" the facts being explained; see Dancy (2000) , Little (2000) , and Leibowitz (2011) .
Such criticisms don't apply to the weaker forms of generalism discussed below. forms of generalism will require some non-deductive model of explanation on which principles nonetheless do some crucial explanatory work.
How might hedged principles be explanatory if they permit exceptions? Some take the "unexceptional" cases where pain is bad, lying wrong and so on, as basic and argue that exceptions can then be explained in terms of deviations from them (Lance and Little 2006a; 2006b) . But again the explanatory burdens might run deeper: just as the moral status of an action requires explanation in terms of its other features, why those other features bear on its moral status in the ways they do might itself require explanation. Consider an example. If a government policy is bad because it increases the inequality of well-being, perhaps there should also be some explanation of why such inequality has negative moral import in the first place. (It seems legitimate to wonder why inequality isn't morally irrelevant instead.) Such an explanation might well turn on features which aren't 48 See Pietroski (1993) , Lance and Little (2006b; , and Väyrynen (2006; 2009b) .
manifested by all instances of inequality. For instance, perhaps unequal distributions of well-being are bad when and because of some such deeper moral flaws as that they are unfair or not to everyone's benefit. Exceptional cases might then be explained in the same stroke by the absence of the very same features whose presence explains why inequality is bad, when it is. Perhaps inequality as such isn't bad when it doesn't result from some unfairness or when it makes everyone better off than they would otherwise be. Some generalists argue that the best account of this kind of explanation delivers principles which incorporate the common explanatory basis of both moral reasons and their enablers and disablers. 49 Grasping such principles might also improve our reliability in detecting reasons, the absence of enablers, the presence of disablers, and so on. What model of normative explanation should particularists endorse? They tend to grant that if some consideration is a moral reason to φ in one context but not another, this requires explanation. One suggestion is that normative explanations seek the kind of unifying structure of the particular circumstances 49 Väyrynen (2006; 2009b) and Robinson (2006; 2011) develop two (otherwise very different) accounts of this kind.
at hand which is characteristic of a (coherent) narrative (Dancy 1993: 106, 112-4) . But so far this suggestion remains impressionistic, and other models that rely in no way even on hedged principles remain to be articulated and defended.
Other suggestions from philosophers who identify themselves as particularists turn on non-deductive models of explanation which appeal to some kind of generalities. 50 In that case generalism and particularism might not be committed to crucially different general models of explanation. But, either way, certain ways forward in the generalism-particularism debate are sensitive to general issues about explanation. Work on their bearing on the debate has barely begun.
Moral Principles and Practical Guidance
In closing I'll turn briefly to the practical role of moral principles as guides.
Some of these are corollaries of theoretical considerations such as the argument from holism. If moral reasons were context-sensitive in some way that principles cannot capture, then relying on principles for guidance might be more likely than not to make agents go morally astray. It might, for instance, encourage the thought that if a consideration was a reason to φ in one case, then it will be a reason to φ in others -precisely what holism say we cannot rely on. Generalism is untouched by this argument if it is compatible with holism. (But recall that holist generalism will require a more complicated program in normative ethics than traditional forms of generalism.)
Reasons holism seems easiest to accommodate if we take practical reasoning to be non-monotonic. Holism says that a reason statement that holds relative to some set of circumstances ψ may no longer hold relative to {ψ, C}, for some additional circumstance C. A classically deductive inference isn't defeasible in this way: once such an inference is valid, it stays valid with the addition of further information. By contrast non-monotonic inference is such that previously drawn conclusions may be withdrawn given further information, although all the original premises are retained. 51 Reasons holism may be a stronger claim than 50 See especially Little (2000) and Lance and Little (2006a; 2006b; . 51 Non-monotonicity is relevant also to the explanatory role of moral principles discussed in the claim that practical reasoning is non-monotonic, since the latter doesn't require the structural distinctions drawn by holism (Dancy 2004: 80 Väyrynen (2004) , Thomas (2011 ), and, especially, Horty (2007 Another prominent particularist worry about principles as guides is that relying on principles tends to direct our attention only to the features which already figure in our principles. This might be thought easily to lead us to miss morally relevant features which we would have noticed, had we only given the details and nuances of the particular case the kind of attentive examination which particularists think can be sufficient for reliably acting well. 55 Relying on principles instead of trying to cultivate the kind of moral sensitivity to particularities which marks the virtuous person is all too likely to breed moral laziness, rigidity or narrow-mindedness in imperfect humans. The particularists' recommended antidote is "principle abstinence". 56
Some generalists respond that principles are more useful than anything particularism offers in ensuring the benefits of interpersonal assurance, coordination and the like (Hooker 2000; . Others respond, more directly to the point of the objection, that principles may be able to provide reliable guidance even if their guidance is fallible and doesn't take the form of a rigid check-list of considerations. Generalists can agree that the kinds of sensitivity to reasons and skill of judgment on which particularists insist are necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for acting well. Generalists can also accommodate the evidence from cognitive science that people's moral decisions are often not consciously based on principles represented in propositional form. 57
Principles might still do important work even if they didn't figure explicitly in the content of our deliberations but instead played a tacit or implicit regulative role that might not be easily amenable to verbal expression. Their guiding role might be, for instance, a kind of constraint satisfaction. In accepting a principle one accepts certain constraints on one's decisions and actions. Principles might, for instance, frame our deliberations without figuring explicitly in their content.
To a rough first approximation, we might understand the acceptance of a moral 55 It seems fair to ask particularists to provide more evidence in support of this worry than they have offered so far. 56 See McNaughton (1988: 62, 190-3) , Dancy (1993 : 64, 67), and, perhaps, McDowell (1979 . 57 For discussion, see McKeever and Ridge (2006: ch. 9 ) and Väyrynen (2008) . See also Dworkin (1995) .
principle as an internalization of a stable ideal or commitment that shapes one's responsiveness to reasons, thereby involving a settled disposition to make certain judgments in the circumstances with which the principle is concerned. 58 (No doubt tweaks are required to deal with various complicated epistemic situations.)
Insofar as one can commit oneself to ideals (such as fairness, honesty and the like) without fully knowing just how they are best conceived or what exactly they imply in particular situations, the acceptance of a principle so understood would seem to bring with it also a commitment to further cultivating one's sensitivities and judgment.
One challenge to particularists is to explain how we are able to learn from moral experience. The typical reply is that experience can inform our judgments So the worry arises whether particularists can offer valuable guidance to that multitude of us who are still trying to refine our moral sensitivities and judgment and to advance on our path towards practical wisdom.
Particularists regard describing someone as "a person of principle" as criticism, not praise. But already the quick sketch above suggests that relying on principles that are more than mere rules of thumb for guidance needn't mean dogmatism, rigidity or narrow-mindedness. As a view about the structure of morality, generalism has no commitment to any particular substantive view about the content of the correct moral principles. Nor need it recommend people to adhere dogmatically to the principles they accept. Fundamentalists and fanatics notwithstanding, many people are uncertain about at least some 58 See e.g. Väyrynen (2008; 2009b) and Albertzart (2013) . Valuable general discussions of issues in this vicinity can be found e.g. in Herman (1993) and O'Neill (1996) . Jordan (2013) suggests that virtues, too, can play the sort of structuring role envisaged for principles here. 59 See Harman (2005) and Leibowitz (forthcoming), as well as Dancy (2004: ch. 8 ).
of the moral views they hold and regard some others as capable of refinement and improvement. Generalists no less than particularists can acknowledge that our actual moral outlooks are works in progress and that resolving uncertainty, mistakes and disagreements about particular moral principles requires thinking hard about a wide range of notoriously messy and complicated moral problems.
All sides can agree that the best remedy for poor moral judgment is better moral judgment. It seems too early to conclude that better moral judgment isn't judgment guided in part by moral principles.
